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Abstract 
Air-gapped computers are disconnected from the Internet physically and logically. This 
measure is taken in order to prevent the leakage of sensitive data from secured networks. In 
the past, it has been shown that malware can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers by 
transmitting ultrasonic signals via the computer’s speakers. However, such acoustic 
communication relies on the availability of speakers on a computer. 
In this paper, we present 'DiskFiltration,' a covert channel which facilitates the leakage of data 
from an air-gapped compute via acoustic signals emitted from its hard disk drive (HDD). Our 
method is unique in that, unlike other acoustic covert channels, it doesn't require the 
presence of speakers or audio hardware in the air-gapped computer. A malware installed on 
a compromised machine can generate acoustic emissions at specific audio frequencies by 
controlling the movements of the HDD's actuator arm. Digital Information can be modulated 
over the acoustic signals and then be picked up by a nearby receiver (e.g., smartphone, 
smartwatch, laptop, etc.). We examine the HDD anatomy and analyze its acoustical 
characteristics. We also present signal generation and detection, and data modulation and 
demodulation algorithms. Based on our proposed method, we developed a transmitter on a 
personal computer and a receiver on a smartphone, and we provide the design and 
implementation details. We also evaluate our covert channel on various types of internal and 
external HDDs in different computer chassis and at various distances. With DiskFiltration we 
were able to covertly transmit data (e.g., passwords, encryption keys, and keylogging data) 
between air-gapped computers to a smartphone at an effective bit rate of 180 bits/minute 
(10,800 bits/hour) and a distance of up to two meters (six feet).  
 
1. Introduction 
An 'air-gap' is a measure taken in order to keep a computer network (or other type of IT 
devices) disconnected from public networks such as the Internet. In air-gap isolation, there is 
no wired or wireless connection between the internal network and the outer world. Given the 
high level of separation, attackers cannot breach the network and steal data using remote 
attacks launched over the Internet. Military networks, as well as networks within financial 
organizations, critical infrastructure, and commercial industries [1] [2], are known to be air-
gapped due to the sensitive data they store and process. Despite the high level of isolation, 
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an air-gap doesn't provide hermetic protection from breach events. Several incidents in which 
air-gapped networks have been compromised have been published in the recent years [3] [4] 
[5] [6]. Infecting such networks can be accomplished through a malicious insider, stolen 
credentials, physical access, and so on [7].    
Once the attacker has a foothold in the target network, he/she may want to exfiltrate valuable 
data. To that end, the attacker has to overcome the physical isolation by bridging the air-gap. 
Over the years, different types of covert channels have been proposed by security 
researchers, enabling exfiltration through an air-gap. Electromagnetic methods that exploit 
electromagnetic radiation from different components of the computer [8] [9] [10] [11] are 
likely the oldest type of covert channel researched. Various types of optical [12], thermal [13], 
and acoustic [14] [15] [16] out-of-band communication channels have also been suggested.  
1.1 Speakerless Computers 
Most of the acoustic covert channels require a speaker (as a transmitter) and a microphone 
(as a receiver) to be installed in the air-gapped computers, in order to enable bi-directional 
covert communication. A malware can encode the data over sonic or ultrasonic frequencies, 
and subsequently broadcast it through the computer speaker. Another computer with a 
microphone can receive the transmissions, decode the data, and sent it to the attacker. To 
avoid such an attack, security policies may prohibit the use of speakers and microphones in a 
secure network, a measure also referred as an 'audio-gap' [17] [18]. Keeping speakers 
disconnected from sensitive computers can effectively mitigate the acoustic covert channels 
based on speakers [19].   
In this paper, we introduce 'DiskFiltration,' an acoustic channel which works even when 
speakers (or other audio related hardware) are not present in the infected computer. Our 
method is based on exploring intrinsic covert noises emitted from the hard disk drive (HDD) 
which exists on most computers today. We show that malicious code on a compromised 
computer can perform 'seek' operations, such as the HDDs moving head (the actuator) will 
induce the generation of such noise patterns at a certain frequency range. Arbitrary binary 
data can therefore be modulated through these acoustic signals, and the signals can then be 
received by a nearby device equipped with a microphone (e.g., smartphone, smartwatch, or 
laptop), and be decoded and finally sent to the attacker.  
1.2 HDD, SSD, and SSHD 
Three primary types of mass storage drives exist today:  
1. Hard Disk Drive (HDD). The hard disk drive uses a mechanical arm (actuator) with a read 
and write head to access information at the correct location on a spinning magnetic 
platter. The hard disk drive is the most prevalent mass storage medium used in PCs, 
servers, legacy systems, and laptops [20]. 
 
2. Solid State Drive (SSD). Solid state drives store the data in interconnected flash memory 
chips (e.g., NAND based flash chips), a type of non-volatile memory. There are no moving 
or mechanical parts to an SSD, and hence they emit virtually no noise. 
 
3. Solid State Hard Drive (SSHD). Solid state hybrid drives (SSHDs) combine HDD and SSD 
technology in the same unit. The flash is used as a cache buffer for frequently used data, 
while the rest of the data is stored on the magnetic media. SSHD contains the HDD’s 
mechanical parts, and hence emits noise when the data stored on the HDD component is 
accessed.  
Our method is based on the acoustic signals generated by the hard drive's mechanical parts, 
and therefore is relevant to HDDs and SSHDs, as opposed to SSDs. Generally speaking, SSDs 
are considered to have advantages over HDDs in term of data access speed, unit size, and 
reliability. Despite the increased rate of adoption of SSDs, HDD are still the most sold storage 
devices, mainly due to their low cost. In 2015, 416 million HDD units were sold worldwide, 
compared to 154 million SSD units. Currently, HDDs still dominate the storage wars, and most 
PCs, servers, legacy systems, and laptops are installed with HDD drives [20]. This means that 
our covert channel is available on most of today’s desktop and servers. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present related work. Section 
3 discusses the attack model. Section 4 introduces the anatomy of hard disk drives, and 
section 5 discusses its acoustic characteristics. Section 5 describes the implementation of the 
transmitter and receiver. Section 6 present evaluation results. Section 7 proposes 
countermeasures, and we conclude in section 8. 
2. Related Work 
Covert channels allowing exfiltration of data from air-gapped computers can be categorized 
into electromagnetic, optical, thermal, and acoustic. The general technique of spying on 
information systems through leaking emanations is also referred as a TEMPEST attack [21] 
[22]. 
 Electromagnetic. Electromagnetic emanations from different computer components 
have been investigated as a medium for data transmission for more than twenty years.  
Intentional emissions from a computer screen was first discussed by Kuhn and Anderson 
[8] and Thiele [23]. More recently, AirHopper malware [24] used the video cable to 
generate FM radio transmissions, in order to leak data to a nearby mobile phone. In the 
same manner, GSMem [11] and Funthenna [25] exploit electromagnetic radiation 
generated from the computer bus to transmit data over the air-gap. Kasmi et al. proposed 
injecting command and control by using electromagnetic interferences [26] [27]. Other 
types of electromagnetic based methods are discussed in [28] [29] [30]. 
  Optic. Optical methods are less discussed in the context of covert channels, since they are 
visible to the surrounding environment. Data leakage through keyboard LEDs was 
proposed in [12] and through office scanner lights in [31]. VisiSploit, a covert optical 
method, was proposed by Guri et al [32]; in this method, data is leaked from the LCD 
screen to a remote camera via an invisible image projected on the screen. 
  Thermal. Air-gap communication using heat emissions was proposed in [13]. In a method 
called BitWhisper, the authors demonstrated slow communication between adjacent air-
gapped computers via heat exchange. Thermal covert channels on modern multicores 
(in the same system) have been thoroughly studied by Bartolini, Miedl and Thiele [33]. 
 
 Acoustic. Acoustic methods are based on leaking data over sound waves at sonic and 
ultrasonic frequencies. Data transmission over audio was first reviewed by 
Madhavapeddy et al. in 2005 [34] when they discussed audio based communication 
between two computers. In 2013, Hanspach and Goetz [35] used near-ultrasonic 
soundwaves to establish a covert channel between air-gapped systems equipped with 
speakers and microphones. They implemented a botnet which communicated between 
computers at distance of 19.7 meters with a bandwidth of 20 bits/second. O’Malley and 
Choo have examined different exfiltration scenarios using laptop speakers and 
microphones at high frequency sounds up to approximately 23kHz [36]. The concept of 
communicating over inaudible sounds has been comprehensively examined by Lee et al 
[15]. The work in [37] extends the ultrasonic covert channel for smartphones, 
demonstrating how data can be transferred up to 30 meters away. Interestingly, in 2013, 
security researchers claimed to find BIOS level malware in the wild (dubbed BadBios) 
which communicates between air-gapped laptops using ultrasonic sound [38]. 
 
Notably, the aforementioned acoustic methods assume installation of audio hardware 
(including speakers) within the transmitting PC or laptop. However, speakers are 
sometimes forbidden from certain computers based on regulations and security practices 
[17]. In 2013, Genkin et al. described a so-called acoustic cryptanalysis key extraction 
attack, which enables the reconstruction of encryption keys from noise generated by the 
CPU [39]. In 2016, Guri et al introduced Fansmitter, a malware which facilitates the 
exfiltration of data from an air-gapped computer via noise intentionally emitted from the 
CPU and chassis fans [40]. In this method, the computer does not need to be equipped 
with audio hardware or an internal or external speaker. Methodologies, mitigation, and 
measurements for out-of-band covert channels are provided in [41] [42] [43]. Table 1 
summarizes the different types of covert channels for air-gapped computers, including 
the acoustic channels. 
 
Table 1. Different types of air-gap covert channels  
Method Examples 
Electromagnetic [8] [9], AirHopper [24], GSMem [11], Funthenna [25] [44] [28] Optical [12] [31], VisiSploit [32] Thermal BitWhipser [13] Acoustic (via speakers)  Acoustic (without speakers) 
[14] [15] [36] [37]  Fansmitter [40], DiskFiltration (this paper)  
3. Attack Model 
DiskFiltration, as an acoustic covert channel, can be used to leak data from air-gapped 
computers. However, this covert channel can also be used in the case of Internet connected 
computers (non air-gapped) in which the network traffic is intensively monitored by 
networked-based intrusion detection (IDS), intrusion prevention (IPS) and data leakage 
prevention (DLP) systems. In these cases, exfiltration of data though the Internet traffic may 
be detected, and hence the attacker may want to resort to an out-of-band covert channel. 
The adversarial attack model consists of a transmitter and a receiver. The transmitter is usually 
an ordinary desktop computer or server with at least one HDD installed. The receiver is a 
nearby device with audio recording capabilities. It can be a smartphone placed on the table, 
a smartwatch on the user’s hand, or a nearby laptop with a microphone (Figure 1).  Infecting 
highly secure networks can be accomplished, as demonstrated by incidents such as Stuxnet 
[45], Agent.Btz [46], and others [47] [48] [7]. Infecting a mobile phone or other recording 
device can be accomplished via different attack vectors, using emails, SMS/MMS, malicious 
apps, and so on [49] [50] [51] [52].   
 
 
 
Figure 1. A typical exfiltration scenario. A compromised computer (A) - without speakers, and with audio hardware disabled - transmits sensitive information via covert acoustic signals generated by its hard disk drive. This information is received and decoded by a nearby mobile phone (B), smartwatch (C), laptop, or other device with recording capabilities. 
 
The malware installed on the computer gathers the data to exfiltrate (e.g., passwords or 
encryption keys), and then transmits it using acoustic signals emitted from the HDD. The 
acoustic signals are generated by performing intentional seek operations which cause the HDD 
actuator arm to make mechanical movements. The nearby receiver receives the transmission, 
decodes the data, and transfers it to the attacker via mobile data, SMS, or Wi-Fi.  
4. Anatomy of a Hard Disk Drive 
In this section we provide the technical background necessary to understand the way 
DiskFiltration works. A more comprehensive description of HDD functionality and its internal 
operation can be found in [53].   
 
 
  
Figure 2. A hard disk drive’s internal parts 
 
The internal view of a hard disk drive is shown in Figure 2. Hard disk drives store data in disks, 
or platters, coated with magnetic material (Figure 2, A). The platters rotate at various speeds, 
depending on the type of HDD. Modern consumer-grade HDDs commonly have rotational 
speeds of 5400, 7200, or 15,000 revolutions per minute (RPM). The engine that rotates the 
platters is the spindle motor (Figure 2, B), and it spins at a constant speed that is tied to the 
RPM of the HDD. Notably, this motor is one of the constant sources of noise from a HDD. The 
magnetic data is read/written from/to the platters using read-and-write heads (Figure 2, C). 
These heads are positioned very close to the magnetic surface (at a distance of nanometers 
from one another) and can detect (read) or change (write) the magnetization of the material 
passing under it. Modern HDDs have several stacked platters, each of which has its own read-
and-write head. All of the read-and-write heads are attached to the actuator arm (Figure 2, 
D). During read and write operations, the actuator (Figure 2, F) rotates the actuator axis 
(Figure 2, E) which moves the read-and-write heads on an arc across the platters as they spin. 
The mechanical movements of the actuator generate noise at different levels and frequencies. 
Video clips showing HDD internal parts during operation can be found online [54] [55]. 
4.1 Disk Geometry 
The basic geometry of the HDD platter is depicted in Figure 3. 
 Figure 3. Basic geometry of an HDD platter 
 
Modern platters are typically made using an aluminum or glass and ceramic substrate which 
stores the magnetic data. Each platter has its own read and write head which reads and writes 
the data from the surface. Physically, the magnetic data is stored on circles on the surface 
known as tracks (Figure 3, A). Corresponding tracks on all surfaces of a drive (on all platters) 
make up a cylinder. Two fundamental terms of disk geometry are the geometrical sector and 
the disk sector. A geometrical sector (Figure 3, B) is a section of a disk between a center, two 
radii, and a corresponding arc. A disk sector (Figure 3, C) refers to the intersection of a track 
and geometrical sector. Logically, the disk sector is the minimum storage unit of a hard drive. 
A detailed description of disk geometry is provided in [53] [56]. 
'Seek' describes the operation of the actuator arm to move to a specific track of the disk where 
the data needs to be read or written. The time it takes to move the head to the desired track 
is called the seek time. As we describe in the following section, the movement of the head 
assembly on the actuator arm during the seek operation emits acoustic noise.  
Today, there are different types of HDDs with various sizes and capacities. The 2.5 inch and 
3.5 inch hard disks are the most popular sizes today. The capacity of modern HDDs is between 
hundreds of gigabytes to few terabytes.  
5. HDD Acoustics 
An HDD emits noise at different frequencies and intensity levels which are produced by the 
movements of its internal parts. Notably, although there have been several studies on the 
acoustic characteristics of a hard drive, the noise emission mechanisms and the precise source 
of such emissions have not been comprehensively modeled [57] [53].  
There are two primary sources of acoustic noise inside a drive: the motor and the actuator. 
These sources correspond with two type of noises as explained below.  
Idle acoustic noise is defined as the noise generated when the HDD spins the disks (platters). 
Idle noise is generated mainly by the spindle motor and the ball bearings inside the motor. 
This main frequency of idle noise can be calculated by ܫ݈݀݁ܯܽ݅݊ܨݎ݁ݍ = ܴܲ  / 60 where 
ܴܲܯ is the HDD rotation speed. Figure 4 shows the spectrogram of the idle acoustic noise 
generated by the Western Digital HDD spinning at 7200 RPM. The primary tone is generated 
at 7200/60 =  120 ܪݖ, and can be seen in the spectrogram as a highlighted continuous 
frequency peak. 
 
Figure 4. Spectrogram of idle acoustic noise generated by a HDD with an RPM of 7200 
 
Seek acoustic noise is generated by the engine of the actuator and its movement during seek, 
read, and write operations. This noise is produced during file system activities (e.g., file read 
and write) and is usually louder than the static Idle acoustic noise. Unlike idle acoustic noise, 
the seek noise depends on many factors (magnetoelectric interactions, vibrations, and so on), 
hence the exact tone frequency cannot be calculated by a formula [57] [53]. The exact seek 
tone frequency regions (expected to be up to a range of 6ܭℎݖ [57]) can be investigated 
through manual or automatic waveform analysis. In this research, we exploit  frequency 
regions which are probably rooted on the hard disk seek time, and in particular, on the 
shortest seek time component, the track-to-track seek time, which is the time required to 
move from adjacent tracks. As is shown later, the most informative frequency region detected 
in our experiments is around 2080 Hz, which is equivalent to a 0.48 ms track-to-track seek 
time. 
5.1 Noise Reduction Technologies 
Many HDD manufacturers include a feature called automatic acoustic management (AAM) 
[58] which aims at reducing seek acoustic noise. Such technologies (e.g., Western Digital 
IntelliSeek [59]) use sophisticated algorithms to regulate the acceleration and positioning of 
the HDD actuator so that the emitted noise is reduced. Enabling and disabling this feature is 
possible with the appropriate software or with an API to the HDD firmware [60] [61] [62]. 
During our experiments we didn't modify the AAM setting, which is usually set to on by 
default. The main reason we do so is to keep our covert channel as stealth and quiet as 
possible in order to evade detection by the user. 
5.2 Acoustic Signal Generation 
As explained, the idle acoustic noise emitted from disk rotation is static and cannot be 
controlled by software. In order to modulate binary data, we exploit the seek acoustic noise 
generated by the movements of the actuator. By regulating (starting and stopping) a sequence 
of seek operations, we control the acoustic signal emitted from the HDD, which in turn can be 
used to modulate binary '0' and '1.' Next, we examine the seek acoustic noise generated by 
three types of operations: read, write, and seek. 
5.2.1 'Read' and 'Write' Operations  
Figure 5 shows the spectrograms of acoustic waveforms generated from the HDD during read 
(left image) and write (right image) operations as recorded from outside the computer chassis. 
In this test we read the content of 100 MB binary file to a buffer in the memory, and write 
100MB of random bytes to a file in the disk. During the tests, the cacheing on all levels was 
bypassed to guarantee physical disk access. Read and write operations cause acoustic bursts 
(as seen as a general increase in frequency for a short time period), during most of these 
operations, the head stays at the same position. 
 
Figure 5. Spectral views of read (left) and write (right) operations 
 
5.2.2 'Seek' Operations 
Figure 6 shows the spectrogram of an acoustical waveform generated from the HDD during 
seek operations as recorded from outside the computer chassis. In this test we repeatedly 
cause the head to move between two consecutive tracks by performing seek operations 
within a loop for a period of three seconds. As can be seen by the highlighted discrete 
frequency peaks in the spectrogram, during the seek operations there is a strong signal wrap 
around a range of discrete frequencies between 1500 – 8000 Hz.   
 
Figure 6. Spectral view of seek operations 
 
We also examine the acoustic noise emitted by seek operations when the actuator moves 
between tracks at different distances. Figure 7 shows the acoustical waveform generated 
from the HDD during seek operations as recorded from outside the computer chassis. In this 
test we perform three types of seek operations, (1) seeking and reading repeatedly from the 
first and last sectors, (2) seeking and reading between two consecutive tracks, and (3) seeking 
and reading between two consecutive sectors. As can be seen, the seek and read operations 
cause an acoustic signal to wrap all over the range of 0 to 6000 Hz. There were no significant 
acoustic differences (frequencies or amplitude) between the three types of seek operations. 
This indicated that in order to emit a noticeable level of noise it is sufficient to perform seek 
operations between any two tracks. In our tests we used the seek operation between the first 
and the last track of the HDD.  
 
Figure 7. Spectral view of 'seek' operations between different tracks 
 
5.3 Cache Avoidance 
In order to efficiently modulate data over the acoustic signal, we need to control the precise 
timing and duration of the HDD operations. In particular, we need to be able to instruct the 
HDD controller to perform an operation at a given time without delay or caching. Modern 
operating systems, including Linux and Windows, employ disk and files I/O caching 
mechanisms in their kernel or device drivers. Such caching can cause timing delays and 
inconsistencies in the generation of the acoustic signals. For efficient and error-free signal 
generation, the OS must be instructed to avoid any type of caching during the I/O operation. 
File system cache avoidance is possible in Linux and Windows [63] [64]. In addition to the OS 
cache, the HDD controllers also use a type of cache. For example, with write-back cache 
enabled, the HDD stores the data to be written in an intermediate buffer rather than in the 
disk. For precise timing of the signal, controller level cache can be turned off using appropriate 
tools [61].  
 
6. Implementation 
In this section we describe the implementation of the DiskFiltation transmitting software, 
including signal generation, data modulation, and bit-framing. We also describe the 
implementation of a receiver as an Android app for the smartphone. 
6.1 Transmitter 
A program can perform disk operations with two types of addressing: file system addressing 
and direct disk addressing. In file system addressing, the running process specifies the file 
name to perform the read or write operations on. In direct addressing, the process specifies 
the physical location on the HDD layout for the required I/O operation, e.g., specifying a sector 
number to read from or write to. Modern OSs, such as Windows and Linux, provide APIs for 
the two type of addressing; in particular, they allowing direct disk addressing [65] [66]. 
Technically, it means that user-level processes can generate the acoustic signals by performing 
seek operations by specifying sector numbers or the location within files. Notably, file level 
operations may not require any special permissions (e.g., root). For example, any process may 
be able to read and write files from or to temporary or working folders.  
We implemented a prototype of the transmitter for the Linux OS. We choose to use the seek 
operation, as it generates the highest level of the acoustic signal. We implemented a C 
program which uses the direct addressing system calls using the fopen(), and fseek() systems’ 
calls [67] [68]. We also used a shell script version of the transmitter using the Linux dd 
command-line utility [69]. This is a low level utility of Linux which can perform a wide range 
of HDD operations (e.g., read or copy) at the file or block level. 
Caching: During the transmissions, we turned off the OS disk cache using the 
/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches in order to instruct the kernel to free the pagecache, dentries, and 
inodes. We also turned off the HDD write-back cache mechanism, using the hdparam 
command line tool [61]. In our shell script, we used the dd with direct the flag (using direct 
I/O for data), and sync flag (using synchronized I/O for data). 
6.1.1 Data Modulation 
To transmit binary data we used a simple on-off keying (OOK) modulation. In this digital 
modulation scheme, data is represented by the presence of a carrier at a specified 
frequency ܨܿ. More specifically, a binary '0' is represented by the presence of a carrier for a duration of ଵܶ, while its absence for the duration of T0 represents a binary '0.'  Algorithm 1 shows a pseudo code for our C program which handles the transmission of a bit ܾ. 
 
The transmitBit procedure receives the '0' and '1' transmission time (T0, T1) and two sector 
numbers for the seek operation (BEGIN_SEC, END_SEC). As we previously explained, in signal 
generation, moving the actuator between the sectors positioned in different tracks produces 
the highest level of noise. If the bit to transmit is '0,' the procedure does nothing by sleeping 
for duration T0. If the bit to transmit is '1,' the procedure invokes seek operations, causing the 
head to repeatedly move between BEGIN_SEC and END_SEC for duration T1.   
A skeleton of a shell script using dd for the transmission of ‘1’ using the seek operation follows. 
Algorithm 1    ܶݎܽ݊ݏ݉݅ݐܤ݅ݐ 1: procedure transmitBit(b, T0, T1, BEGIN_SEC, END_SEC) 2:  sync(); //drop cache 3:  hddDev = open(/dev/sda) 4:  if (b='0') then  5:         Sleep (T0); 6:         return; 7:  if (b='1') then  8:         for time T1 do 9:              seek(hddDev, BEGIN_SEC); 10             seek(hddDev, END_SEC); 11:         end for 12:  return; 
 
 
The sample script runs the actuator between two sectors using a simple read operation. Note 
that the sector numbers are incremented at every iteration. This is done to evade a potential 
caching mechanism (within the OS or HDD controller). The BEGIN_SEC and BEGIN_SEC have 
to be selected, because they are positioned on different tracks. 
6.1.2 Bit Framing 
As explained previously, unlike the idle acoustic noise, seek acoustic noise may vary depending 
on the type of HDD, and differences in seek acoustic noise can also vary between HDDs of the 
same model. Although the general range of seek tone frequency is known (e.g., 0 − 6ܭℎݖ [57]), the exact tone frequency cannot be calculated by a formula. This implies that a 
potential receiver (e.g., an application in a smartphone) needs to scan the frequency range 
first, in order to find and detect the carrier used for the on-off keying modulation. In addition, 
଴ܶ and ଵܶ may be set differently on each transmitter (e.g., given the expected SNR), and may be unknown to the receiver in advance. To assist the receiver in dynamically synchronizing 
with the transmitter parameters, we transmit data in small frames. Each frame consists of a 
preamble sequence of four bits and a payload of 36 bits (Table 2).  
Table 2. A frame consisting of four bits of preamble, followed by a payload of 36 bits 
Preamble (4 bits) Payload (36 bits) 1010 0101110101010101…  
The preamble consists of the '1010' sequence and is used by the receiver to periodically 
determine the carrier frequency. In addition, the preamble header allows the receiver to 
identify the beginning of a transmission in the area and extract other channel parameters, 
such as ଴ܶ and ଵܶ. 
6.1.3 Stealth  
As noted, modern HDDs include a feature called AAM [58] which reduces seek acoustic noise. 
In order to keep the covert channel as stealth as possible, we did not modify the AAM setting, 
resulting in quiet HDD operation. Our experiments show that in modern HDDs, the generated 
acoustic signals blend with the background noise and are not noticeable by the user. Users 
may notice the HDD activity by seeing the HDD’s blinking LED or hearing unusual seek noise. 
#!/bin/sh  i=0 a= BEGIN_SEC b= END_SEC  while [ $i -lt $1 ] do    sync    echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches    dd if=/dev/sda of=/dev/null skip=$a count=1 bs=512    dd if=/dev/sda of=/dev/null skip=$b count=1 bs=512    i=`expr $i + 1`    a=`expr $a + 10000`    b=`expr $b + 10000` done 
However, such occurrences won’t raise suspicions, since they aren’t out of ordinary because 
the HDD is routinely active due to swapping, indexing, backups, and other types of background 
operations. 
 
6.2 The Receiver 
Directly decoding the acoustic information from the transmitted waveform is not efficient, 
since the relevant information encoded by the induced HDD operations are concentrated in 
narrowband frequency regions. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the captured waveform can 
be significantly improved by exploiting the informative spectral regions, rather than the whole 
frequency spectrum. In this research, these regions are defined experimentally, because a 
theoretical determination of the position of the spectral peaks is quite complex, as discussed 
earlier.  
In order to analyze our distinct encoding, we estimated the SNR in the frequency domain (as 
opposed to the time domain) as follows. Our "signal" (X) level is estimated by summing the 
magnitudes of the FFT bins within our defined informative regions (R) during induced seek 
operations (bit 1). Noise level (N) is estimated in the same way, during an idle noise interval 
(bit 0). The SNR (in dB) is therefore the logarithm ratio of these two quantities: 
 
ܴܵܰோ = 20 ∗ ݈݋݃ ൭෍|ܺ௞|
௞ୀோ
෍| ௞ܰ|
௞ୀோ
൘ ൱ 
 
The signal adds up coherently in the frequency domain, whereas noise adds up incoherently. 
Therefore, in order to maximize the SNR, we would like to define R encompassing the most 
informative frequency bins. Note that the windowing settings and number of spectral bins 
used should be optimized in order to avoid spectral leaking (single frequencies spread through 
adjacent bins) and improve the SNR characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 8. PSD density for 'seek' and 'idle' signals 
 
Figure 8 depicts the power spectral density (PSD) for seek and idle wave excerpts from the 
seek and read operations. The PSD reflects the average power of the signal in a logarithmic 
scale during a specific time-frequency region. It is expressed in dB relative to the auditory 
threshold. This wave was captured at a very close distance to the source, at 44.1 kHz, and 
resampled to 16 kHz. Fast Fourier transform (FFT) was calculated for 160 bins, spanning 50 Hz 
each. Spectral peaks are clearly spotted in the graphs, and the strongest low frequency peaks 
correspond to the basic frequency of 120 Hz generated by a 7200 RPM disk. Figure 9 depicts 
the seek-idle PSD ratio for each frequency bin in greater detail. It can be observed that the 
2050-2100 Hz region is the most informative in terms of the SNR. This means that optimal SNR 
estimation should be focused on this region. For instance, direct SNR calculation on the whole 
waveform (using all frequency bins) yields an SNR of 1.5 dB, as opposed to 12.0 dB obtained 
by setting R to 2050-2100 Hz (using the bin corresponding to the highest SNR). 
 
Figure 9. PSD SNR as function of the frequency 
 
6.2.1 Signal Decoding 
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From a signal processing perspective, our decoder can be implemented as an envelope 
detector of the waveform energy in the above mentioned frequency regions. In particular, we 
band-pass filter the received waveform between 2050-2100 Hz and then smooth the 
narrowband signal, convolving with an analysis window in order to estimate its intensity. The 
window length should be adjusted according to the bit transmission rate. An example of such 
processing (using Praat [70]) is shown in Figure 10, for a sequence of five 'seek' pulses filled 
with idle gaps, emitted by the source within a distance of one meter from the receiver. Figure 
10,a shows the original waveform. The same waveform after band-pass filtering is seen in 
Figure 10,b. Finally, intensity values for the filtered waveform are shown in Figure 10,c. 
Intensity values are relative to the auditory threshold levels. Our values which are around this 
threshold suggest that the signal can still be decoded despite being barely audible.  
 
         Figure 10. Waveform of the signal (one meter apart), original (a), filtered (b), and decoded (c)                                                                                  
 
 
6.2.2 Receiver Implementation 
The acoustic transmissions can be received by a nearby computer with a microphone, a 
smartphone placed on the desktop, or other types of recording devices. This subsection briefly 
describes the receiver implementation. Note that audio sampling and on-off keying 
demodulation are widely used for commutation, and hence are not considered the main 
contribution of this paper. We refer interested readers to a detailed theoretical explanation 
and available source-code [71] [72] [73]. 
We implemented a receiver as an app installed on a Samsung Galaxy S4 (I9500) mobile phone 
with a standard microphone with a sampling rate of 44.1 ݇ܪݖ. The main functionality of the 
receiver is (1) audio sampling, (2) performing moving windows FFT, (3) preamble detection, 
and (4) payload demodulation (Algorithm 2).  
 
The receiver continuously samples the audio signals from the recording device - usually the 
built-in microphone (line 1). Technically, this is done by utilizing the AudioRecord class in the 
Android framework [74]. We then transfer the signal to the frequency domain using Furrier 
transform (line 2) [75] . In its PAYLOAD state, the code continuously tries to detect a preamble, 
by scanning for a sequence of "1010" (a sequence of signal, no signal, signal, no signal). Once 
payload is detected, the channel properties (e.g., transmission time, noise, etc.) are saved, 
and the state is set to PAYLOAD (line 4). In a PAYLOAD state, the code demodulates a sequence 
of 32 bits using the OOK scheme (line 7), then returns to the PREAMBLE state (line 9). Note 
that error detection and error correction mechanisms, as well as handling of signal loss, are 
omitted from the algorithm. 
7. Evaluation 
In this section we present the evaluation results based on our experiments and analysis.  
Transmitter. In our experiments, we used desktop computers installed with the transmitting 
application as our transmitter. The application can be configured to use 'read,' 'write,' or 'seek' 
operations, as well as to operate with specified transmission times and predefined sector 
numbers. During the experiments we checked five different PC desktop workstations with five 
types of internal HDDs. In addition, we tested external HDDs. The list of the computers and 
HDDs used during the tests is presented in Table 3. 
 
Algorithm 2    ܴ݁ܿ݁݅ݒ݁ݎ 1:  S = SampleAudio(); 2:  FreqWindow =  UpdateMovingWindow(S); 3:  if (state == PREAMBLE) then 3:         ChannelProp = DetectPreamble("1010", FreqWindow); 4:         SetState(PAYLOAD); 5:   if (state == PAYLOAD) then 6:         newBit = OOKDemodulate(FreqWindow); 7:         payloadBuffer.addBit(newBit) 8:         if (payloadBuffer.size == 32) then  9:              SetState(PREAMBLE); 10:  GOTO 1; 
 
Table 3. Desktop computers and HDD models tested 
# Type Model Chassis HDD-L Internal  Seagate Barracuda 7200.12 ST31000524AS 1TB 7200 RPM 32MB Cache SATA 6.0Gb/s 3.5 Inch 
Lenovo 
HDD-O Internal  WD Blue 1TB Desktop Hard Disk Drive - 7200 RPM SATA 6Gb/s 64MB Cache 3.5 Inch Optiplex HDD-A Internal Seagate Barracuda 7200.12 ST3500418AS 500GB 7200 RPM 16MB Cache SATA 3.0Gb/s 3.5 Inch 
Antec 
HDD-I Internal WD Blue 1TB Desktop Hard Disk Drive - 7200 RPM SATA 6Gb/s 64MB Cache 3.5 Inch Infinity HDD-G Internal Seagate Desktop HDD ST1000DM003 1TB 64MB Cache SATA 6.0Gb/s 3.5 Inch Gigabyte HDD-EX External WD 500GB drive 2.5" 5400 RPM -  
During our experiments we did not modify the HDD's automatic acoustic management (AAM) 
setting, which is usually set on by default. The main reason for this is to keep our covert 
channel as stealth and quiet as possible in order to evade detection by the user. During all of 
the experiments the HDDs were firmly installed within computer cases in their usual internal 
drawers (except for the external HDDs). Before the experiments we validated that the 
computers’ cases were firmly enclosed.  
We run the transmitter on desktop computers running the Linux Ubuntu OS, 64-Bit version 
14.04.3 kernel 3.13.0. We implemented a version of the receiver as an app for the Android 
OS. All of our tests were conducted using the Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone (GT-I9500) 
installed with stock Android Lollipop (5.0.1). Our testing environment consisted of a computer 
lab with ordinary background noise, seven workstations, several network switches, and an 
active air conditioning system. 
Figures 11 and 12 show the acoustical waveform generated from HDD-L, as received by a 
stationary smartphone placed at a distance of one meter and two meters, respectively, from 
the transmitter. In the two tests we used the 'seek and write' method for the transmission.  
Using on-off keying modulation, we transmitted a payload of "101010" when ଴ܶ = 2 sec and 
ଵܶ = 1 sec. The received waveform was band-pass filtered between 2050-2100 Hz.  
 
 
Figure 11. Spectral view of the signal emitted from HDD-L, as received from a distance of one meter  
 
Figure 12. Spectral view of the signal emitted from HDD-L, as received from a distance of two meters 
  
 
 
  
Figure 13 shows the acoustical waveforms generated in four tests. HDD-O (Figure 13, a), 
received by a stationary smartphone placed at a distance of one meter, 'seek and read' 
method (using dd), and ଴ܶ = ଵܶ = 5 sec. HDD-A (Figure 13, b), received by a stationary smartphone placed at a distance of one meter, 'seek & read' method (using dd), and ଴ܶ = ଵܶ = 3 sec. HDD-I (Figure 13, c), received by a stationary smartphone placed at a distance of one 
meter, 'seek & read' method (using dd), and ଴ܶ = ଵܶ = 3 sec. HDD-G (Figure 11, d), received by a stationary smartphone placed at a distance of 0.5 meter, 'seek & read' method (using dd), 
and ଴ܶ = ଵܶ = 3 sec. The received waveform was band-pass filtered between 2050-2100 Hz. In all tests we used on-off keying modulation to transmit a payload of "101010." 
 
Figure 13. Spectral view of the signal emitted from four hard drives (HDD-O, HDD-A, HDD-I, and HDD-G) 
 
 
Figure 14 shows the acoustical waveform generated from HDD-EX, as received by a stationary 
smartphone placed at a distance of one meter from the transmitter. In the two tests we use 
the 'seek and read' method for the transmission. Using on-off keying modulation, we 
transmitted a payload of "101010" when ଴ܶ = ଵܶ = 3 sec. The received waveform was band-pass filtered between 2050-2100 Hz.  
 
 
Figure 14.  Spectral view of the signal emitted from HDD-EX  at a distance of one meter 
 
7.1 Casual Noise Emission 
Since our covert channel is based on HDD activity, casual file operations of other running 
processes may interfere with the transmissions and interrupt them. Our experiments shows 
that most applications generate short bursts of noise with only moderate interruptions to the 
transmission activity. Figure 15 shows the acoustical waveform generated by HDD-I, when the 
computer was idle, playing video, and performing compilation for a 22 second period  
 
 
Figure 15. Spectral view of the signal emitted from HDD-I during different workloads 
As can be seen, the noise generated by casual operations is fleeting in bursts. There are two 
main reason for this phenomena. First, applications usually read and write files in a sequential 
manner, sector by sector. This means that most applications rarely seek between different 
tracks (e.g., files are stored on the same track), which minimizes the acoustic emission from 
the HDD. Second, the caching mechanisms (in the OS or in the HDD controller) try to reduce 
the amount of physical access to the hard drive, which minimizes the number of seek 
operations, and hence the acoustic emissions. 
 
7.2 Bit Rate 
The bit rate depends on the bit transmission time ( ଴ܶ and ଵܶ) in the on-off keying modulation. Given that  ܶ =  ଴ܶ = ଵܶ, the time it takes to transmit ݊ bits is ݊ ∗ ܶ. The values of ଴ܶ and ଵܶ may vary, depending on the background noise and the expected distance between the 
transmitter and the receiver. During our experiments we found that in quiet places, a value of  
଴ܶ = ଵܶ= 0.3 seconds allows demodulation with a bit error rate (BER) that is close to 0%. These values of ଴ܶ and ଵܶ imply a bit rate of 3 bit/sec = 180 bit/min.  
 
8. Countermeasures 
Countermeasures to mitigate the DiskFiltration attack can be classified into three categories: 
hardware based, software based, and procedural based (summarized in Table 5).  
Hardware based countermeasures. Replacing the HDD drives with SSD can eliminate the 
threat, since SSDs are not mechanical, hence generating virtually no noises. However, 
replacement of the hard drive in existing infrastructure may not be always practical due to the 
high cost [20]. In addition, most PCs, servers, legacy systems, and laptops are still shipped with 
HDD drives [20]. Acquiring a particularly quiet type of HDD [76] or installing the HDD within 
special enclosures [77] can also limit the range of emitted noise.  
Another type of hardware product includes signal detection and signal jamming systems. 
Noise detectors [78] aim at monitoring the background noise at specified frequency ranges. 
However, such noise detectors are usually limited to use in a quiet environment without noise. 
Jamming the HDD signal by generating static noise in the background is also possible [79] but 
not particularly applicable in a work environment due to the disturbance it may cause to users. 
Software based countermeasures. At the software and firmware level, modern HDDs include 
a feature called automatic acoustic management (AAM) [58] which reduces seek acoustic 
noise. Ensuring that the AAM settings are at their correct values can limit the range of the 
emitted signals. As noted, the evaluation in this paper was performed with the default AAM 
settings, which are configured to their optimal values. Another solution may involve using host 
intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and host intrusion prevention systems (HIPS) to detect and 
prevent suspicious 'seek' pattern on HDDs. Such software based countermeasures can be 
evaded by malware and rootkits at the OS kernel [80] [81]. In addition, distinguishing between 
legitimate read, write, and seek operations and malicious ones may not be a trivial task.  
Procedural based countermeasures. Procedural countermeasures involve a physical 
separation of emanating equipment from potential receivers. This approach is referred to as 
zone separation by United States and NATO standards [18] [82]. In these standards sensitive 
computers are kept in restricted areas in which certain equipment is banned. In our case, 
smartphone and other types of recording devices should not be permitted in close proximity 
of the computer. 
 
Table 4. Different types of countermeasures Method Type Hardware based  Replacing HDDs with SSDs   Acquiring quiet HDDs  Installing special enclosures  Noise detectors  Signal jammers Software based  HIDS/HIPS  Malicious activity detection  Proper configuration of AAM Procedural  Zone separation  
9. Conclusion 
In this work we present a new type of acoustical out-of-band covert channel code-named 
DiskFiltration. In this method, an attacker can leak binary data from computers over covert 
noises emanating from hard disk drives. Unlike most of the existing acoustic covert channels, 
DiskFiltration can work in computers that are not equipped with speakers or audio hardware. 
Malicious code installed on the computer can perform intentional seek operations, which 
cause the HDD head (the actuator) to move between different tracks. The mechanical 
movements generate acoustic signals which can be used for '0' and '1' modulation. The covert 
signals can be received by a nearby recording device such as a smartphone, smartwatch, 
laptop, etc. Despite DiskFiltration’s general contribution to the field of covert channels, it is 
particularly relevant in two adversarial scenarios:  (1) in air-gapped networks where there is 
no network connection between the computer and the Internet, and (2) in computers with 
heavily monitored (by IDS and IPS systems) Internet connections. In these cases an attacker 
may resort to out-of-band covert exfiltration channels which are not monitored by existing 
defense measures. We provided the main technical details regarding the anatomy of modern 
HDDs and examined the acoustic signals generated by their basic read, write, and seek 
operations. Based on our observations we designed a rather simple data modulation and 
demodulation protocol and implemented a prototype of a transmitter (for a computer) and a 
receiver (for smartphones). We evaluate the covert channel in different types of HDDs and 
computer chassis, and examine its distance, signal quality, and bandwidth. Finally, we present 
different types of countermeasures to mitigate this threat. Results shows that DiskFiltration 
can be used to covertly transfer data to distance of up to two meters (six feet) from the 
transmitting computer at a bit rate of 180 bits/min (10,800 bits/hour). 
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